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Abstract. A periodic behavior is a well observed phenomena in biological
and economical systems. We show that evolutionary games on graphs with
imitation dynamics can display periodic behavior for an arbitrary choice of
game theoretical parameters describing social-dilemma games. We construct
graphs and corresponding initial conditions whose trajectories are periodic with
an arbitrary minimal period length. We also examine a periodic behavior
of evolutionary games on graphs with the underlying graph being an acyclic
(tree) graph. Astonishingly, even this acyclic structure allows for arbitrary
long periodic behavior.
1. Introduction
Evolutionary game theory on graphs in the spirit of Nowak and May [13] studies
the evolution of social behavior in spatially structured populations. In our setting,
each vertex of a graph is assigned a strategy. In every time step, each vertex
plays a matrix game with its imminent neighbors. The resulting game utilities
together with the update order (certain vertices can remain rigid) and the update
function result in the change of strategy to the subsequent time step. Here, we
focus on the case of synchronous update order and deterministic imitation dynamics
- every vertex copies the strategy of the most successful neighbor including itself.
From a biological point of view, it is natural to consider a stochastic update rule
leading mathematically to a Markov chain. This is also the approach taken by most
rigorous investigations of such systems, see for example [4] and [2]. Randomness
can also be used to introduce mutations of the individuals into the model, see for
example [2]. However, questions about the dynamical behavior of these models
often become intractable because of the stochastic nature of the system. Different
authors therefore also studied deterministic versions of the model, see for example
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[1, 5, 9, 11, 13, 14]. The results regarding this deterministic version, however, are
almost all obtained by simulations.
One of the factors influencing dynamics heavily are the parameters of the un-
derlying matrix game. We consider a two strategy game (Cooperation, Defection)
whose interpretation leads to a natural division of the parameter space into 4 scenar-
ios Prisoner’s dilemma, Stag hunt, Hawk and dove, Full cooperation. The equilibria
of the replicator dynamics based on matrix games with such parameters are already
well known, [8].
In [13] it was shown by simulations that even on lattices these dynamical systems
can show very complicated behavior starting from a very simple initial condition,
see also Chapter 9 in [12]. Nowak and May show for example that the systems
can exhibit cascading behavior. Most of the time, such constructions work for very
specific choices of parameters.
Our main questions is thus: Can arbitrarily long periodic behavior happen for all
parameter choices? For example, the replicator dynamics with parameters of HD
scenario tend to a stable mixed equilibrium but only pure equilibria are attractive
for the other scenarios. The spatial structure of the game must be thus thoroughly
examined. We will answer the question positively by explicitly constructing the
graphs demonstrating the required behavior for each set of parameters.
In this paper, we focus on evolutionary games on a graph with periodic trajecto-
ries along which the strategy profiles (number of cooperators and defectors) change.
Periodic behavior with no change in the strategy profiles was observed for example
in [12] by Nowak and May in a structure they called a walker (spaceship in cellular
automata terms). Moreover, such a structure is automorphism invariant in a cer-
tain sense; for each time step, there exists a graph automorphism which keeps the
moving walker in one place. Such structures may be of interest for future research.
We note, that our constructions introduce a periodic behavior of arbitrary length
both in strategy vectors (distribution of strategies) and strategy profiles.
Evolutionary games on graphs also form a very interesting class of cellular au-
tomata. Cellular automata on a lattice can take into account the relative spatial
position of a neighbor. The dependence on the neighbor on the left might differ
from the dependence on the neighbor on the right. On an arbitrary graph this is
only possible if the edges carry some kind of label. A cellular automaton in which
the new state of a cell depends only on its own state and the number of neighboring
cells in each state is called totalistic. Such cellular automata are naturally defined
also on unlabeled graphs. While evolutionary games as considered here are not
totalistic, they nevertheless are defined on unlabeled graphs in an obvious way. See
[10] for a discussion of cellular automata on graphs.
The paper is organized as follows. We introduce basic notation and the dynamics
of evolutionary games on a graph in Section 2. In Section 3, Theorem 3.1, answering
the main question of this paper, is stated and proved. The proof is carried out
for two separate cases depending on the parameter scenario. Periodic behavior of
evolutionary games on a graph with the underlying graph being a tree is examined
in Section 4. We conclude our results in Section 5.
2. Preliminaries
We are considering undirected connected graphs G as the spatial structure of
our game with the vertices V being players. The interactions between vertices
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are defined by a set of edges E (no edge means no direct interaction). The m-
neighborhood of the vertex i (the set of all vertices having distance to i exactly m)
is denoted by Nm(i). We also define
N≤m(v) :=
m⋃
n=1
Nn(v) ∪ {v}.
The strategy set of the game is simply S = {”Cooperate”, ”Defect”} = {C,D} =
{1, 0}. The neighboring vertices play a matrix game where the resulting utilities
are defined by the matrix
C D
C a b
D c d
and the utility function u. For example, if player A cooperates and player B defects,
player A gets utility b and player B gets utility c. In each time step, a certain subset
of players is allowed to change their strategy based on the update order T . Finally,
the strategy update is defined by a function ϕ. A general framework of evolutionary
games on graphs was developed in [7]. An evolutionary game on a graph can be
formally defined as follows.
Definition 2.1. An evolutionary game on a graph is a quintuple (G, pi, u, T , ϕ),
where
(i) G = (V,E) is a connected graph,
(ii) pi = (a, b, c, d) are game-theoretical parameters,
(iii) u : SV → RV is a utility function,
(iv) T : N0 → 2V is an update order,
(v) ϕ : (N0)2≥ × SV → SV is a dynamical system.
The strategy vector (the state of the system) will be denoted X = (x1, . . . , x|V |) ∈
SV . For a strategy vector X ∈ SV , the strategy of the vertex v is Xv. The utility
of a player v is given by uv(X).
Our main focus lies in social dilemma games and we are thus interested in the
game-theoretical parameters P describing such games. In particular, it is more
advantageous if the opponent cooperates than if it defects for each player, i.e.
min{a, c} > max{b, d} .
This results into four possible scenarios: Prisoner’s dilemma (PD): c > a > d > b,
Stag hunt (SH): a > c > d > b, Hawk and dove (HD): c > a > b > d and
Full cooperation (FC): a > c > b > d. Demanding the inequalities to be strict
only excludes sets of measure zero. This generic payoff assumption is common in
examining game-theoretical models (see e.g. [3]). From now on, we consider the
mean utility function
ui(X) =
1
|N1(i)|
a ∑
j∈N1(i)
XiXj + b
∑
j∈N1(i)
Xi(1−Xj)+
+c
∑
j∈N1(i)
(1−Xi)Xj + d
∑
j∈N1(i)
(1−Xi)(1−Xj)

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which is an averaged sum of the outcomes of the matrix games played with direct
neighbors. Without loss of generality, we can now assume a = 1, d = 0 and thus
the parameter regions can be depicted in the plane (see Figure 1).
−3 0 10
1
4
PD HD
SH
FC
b
c
Figure 1. Regions of admissible parameters P with normalization
a = 1, d = 0.
This simplification can be done thanks to the averaging property of the mean
utility function (see [6, Remark 8.]). In Question 1, Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 4.1
we assume a synchronous update order only, i.e. T (t) = V for all t ∈ N0. In other
words, all vertices are updated simultaneously at every time step. However, the
definitions from Section 2 make sense for an arbitrary update order. Finally, the
dynamical system ϕ follows the deterministic imitation dynamics; namely, each ver-
tex adopts the strategy of its most successful neighbor (including itself). Formally,
ϕi(t+ 1, t,X) =
{
Xmax i ∈ T (t), |Ai(X)| = 1 and Ai(X) = {Xmax} ,
Xi otherwise ,
where
Ai(x) = {Xk | k ∈ argmax {uj(X) | j ∈ N1(i) ∪ {i}}} .
We refer to [6] for further discussion on the utility function, update order and the
dynamics.
Considering a deterministic dynamical system, the natural interest lies in exam-
ining the existence and properties of fixed points – strategy vectors X∗ ∈ SV for
which ϕ(t, 0, X∗) = X∗ for t ∈ N0. This topic was studied in [7]. Another notion is
the one of a periodic trajectory, a periodic behavior of a game on a graph.
Definition 2.2. Given an evolutionary game E = (G, pi, u, T , ϕ) on a graph and an
initial state X0, the sequence of strategy vectors X = (X(0), X(1), . . .) ∈
[
SV
]N0
is
called the trajectory of E = (G, pi, u, T , ϕ) with initial state X0 if for all t ∈ N0 we
have
X(0) = X0 ,
X(t+ 1) = ϕ(t+ 1, t,X(t)).
ON PERIODIC ORBITS OF EVOLUTIONARY GAMES 5
The trajectory is called periodic with period p ∈ N if X(t+ p) = X(t) for t ∈ N0.
The previous definition admits an arbitrary choice of the update order. In gen-
eral, two games E1 = (G, pi, u, T1, ϕ), E2 = (G, pi, u, T2, ϕ) with the same initial
condition X0 may not have the same trajectory.
Note that a vertex playing a certain strategy will keep its strategy if surrounded
by vertices playing the same strategy. Thus, it is reasonable to define a cluster of
cooperators and defectors and their inner and boundary vertices. The inner (IC)
and boundary (BC) cooperators are defined by
VIC = {i ∈ V | Xi = 1 and Xj = 1 for all j ∈ N1(i)} ,
VBC = {i ∈ V | Xi = 1 and there exists j ∈ N1(i) with Xj = 0} .
Boundary (BD) and inner (ID) defectors are defined analogously.
The basic question we are answering in this paper can now be formulated using
the notation introduced in this section:
Question 1. Given admissible parameters pi = (a, b, c, d) ∈ P, a utility function
u, an update order T , dynamics ϕ and a number p ∈ N, does there exist a con-
nected graph G and an initial state X0 such that X is a periodic trajectory of the
evolutionary game E = (G, pi, u, T , ϕ) on a graph with minimal period p?
3. Existence of a periodic orbit of arbitrary length
In the following, graphs and subgraphs are denoted by big calligraphic letters
(e.g., G), sets of vertices are denoted by capital letters (e.g., K) and single vertices
are denoted by lower case letters (e.g., v).
Theorem 3.1. Let pi = (a, b, c, d) ∈ P be admissible parameters, u the mean util-
ity function, T the synchronous update order, ϕ deterministic imitation dynam-
ics and p ∈ N. Then there exists a graph G and an initial state X0 such that
X = (X(0), X(1), . . .) is a periodic trajectory of minimal length p of the evolution-
ary game E = (G, pi, u, T , ϕ) on a graph with initial state X0.
Theorem 3.1 formally answers Question 1. The proof will be carried out for the
cases a > c (FC and SH scenario) and c > a (HD and PD scenario) separately. We
construct a connected graph, define an initial state and show, that the resulting
trajectory is periodic with the required minimal period length p.
3.1. Proof of Theorem 3.1 for FC and SH scenarios.
3.1.1. The graph and initial state. The construction of our graph depends on p
and three parameters q, r, s ∈ N which we will choose later. See Figure 2 for an
illustration of the graph structure. Let S be the bipartite graph with classes S1 and
S2 each having s vertices. Add a vertex hS incident with all vertices in S1 and a
vertex fS incident with exactly one vertex in S2.
Now take 2p − 1 copies of the complete graph with q vertices, denoted by
K−(p−1), . . . ,Kp−1, and chain them together to form a ladder-like structure. Add
one vertex g connected to all vertices in K0. Denote the vertices in Kn by {kn,` | ` =
1, . . . , q} for n = −(p− 1), . . . , p− 1 such that kn,` and kn+1,` are connected by an
edge for n = −(p − 1), . . . , p − 2 and ` = 1, . . . , q. Add q · r many copies of S and
denote them by S`,m for ` = 1, . . . , q and m = 1, . . . , r. Connect fS`,m to all vertices
in {kn,` | n = −(p− 1), . . . , p− 1} for m = 1, . . . , r and ` = 1, . . . , q. We denote the
graph thus obtained G.
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Set H := {hS`,m | ` = 1, . . . , q, m = 1, . . . , r}. Let I be the set of all neighbors
of vertices in H, let J be the set of all neighbors of vertices in I which are not
already in H, and set F := {fS`,m | ` = 1, . . . , q, m = 1, . . . , r}. Finally set
Kn := {kn,` | ` = 1, . . . , q} ∪ {k−n,` | ` = 1, . . . , q} for n = 0, . . . , p − 1 and
K := K0 ∪ · · · ∪Kp−1.
Let X0 be the state in which all vertices in H ∪ I ∪K0 ∪{g} are cooperating and
all other vertices are defecting, that is,
(X0)v := 1, v ∈ I ∪H ∪K0 ∪ {g} ,
(X0)v := 0, v ∈ F ∪ J ∪ (K1 ∪ · · · ∪Kp−1) .
g
K
J
I
H
F
S2,1
S1,1
K1−p,2
k1−p,2
k1−p,1
k1−p,3
fS2,1
hS2,1
Figure 2. Example of the graph G with parameters p = 5, q = 3,
r = 2 and s = 4. Cooperators are depicted by full circles.
3.1.2. Dynamics. Let X = (X(0), X(1), . . . ) be the trajectory of the evolution-
ary game with parameters (a, b, c, d), synchronous update order, mean utility and
imitation dynamics on the graph G constructed above with initial state X0. Let
uv(t) := u(Xv(t)) be the utility of the vertex v at time t. We will show that for
suitable parameters q, r, s the dynamics with initial value X0 is the following. All
vertices not in K do not change their strategy and cooperation spreads along the
ladder for p time steps. After p time steps, we reach again the initial state X0 since
all vertices in K \K0 switch back to defection. More precisely, for t = 0, . . . , p− 1
we have
Xv(t) = Xv(0) , v ∈ F ∪H ∪ I ∪ J ∪K0 ∪ {g} ,
Xv(t) = 1 , v ∈ K0 ∪ · · · ∪Kt ,
Xv(t) = 0 , v ∈ Kt+1 ∪ · · · ∪Kp−1
and X(p) = X(0). We first ensure that all vertices not in K do not change their
strategy. The vertices in H have utility a, the highest achievable one, and therefore
all vertices in I ∪H always cooperate. By the same argument, the vertex g and its
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neighbors K0 stay cooperators at all time steps. We want the vertices in J to stay
defectors by never imitating the strategy of their neighbors in I, hence we want
uj(t) > ui(t) , t = 0, . . . , p− 1, i ∈ I, j ∈ J .(1)
Every vertex in F should stay defecting. This is ensured if
uj(t) > ukn(t) , t = 0, . . . , p− 1, j ∈ J, n = 0, . . . t, kn ∈ Kn .(2)
We now want cooperation to spread along the ladder for t = 0, . . . , p − 2. At
time t, the vertices in Kt+1 should copy the strategy from the vertices in Kt and
all vertices in Kn with n = 0, . . . , t should keep cooperating. Defecting vertices
without cooperating neighbors always have a lower utility than defecting vertices
with cooperating neighbors, hence the later never imitate the former.
It is therefore sufficient to have
ukn(t) > uf (t) , t = 0, . . . , p− 2, n = 0, . . . , t, kn ∈ Kn, f ∈ F ,(3)
ukt(t) > ukt+1(t) , t = 0, . . . , p− 2, kt ∈ Kt, kt+1 ∈ Kt+1 .(4)
In the time step from p− 1 to p, we want the big reset to occur. The utility of the
vertices in F should be greater than the utilities of all vertices in K, in other words,
uf (p− 1) > uk(p− 1) , f ∈ F, k ∈ K .(5)
3.1.3. Bounds for the utilities and the resulting inequalities. We now give bounds
for the utilities involved in the inequalities (1) to (5).
uj(t) >
sc+ d
s+ 1
, t = 0, . . . , p− 1, j ∈ J ,
ui(t) =
a+ sb
s+ 1
, t = 0, . . . , p− 1, i ∈ I ,
uf (t) <
(2p− 3)c+ 3d
2p
, t = 0, . . . , p− 2, f ∈ F ,
uf (p− 1) = (2p− 1)c+ d
2p
, f ∈ F ,
ukn(t) <
(q + 2)a+ rb
q + 2 + r
, t = 0, . . . , p− 1, n = 0, . . . , t, kn ∈ Kn ,
ukn(t) >
qa+ (r + 2)b
q + 2 + r
, t = 0, . . . , p− 2, n = 0, . . . , t, kn ∈ Kn ,
ukt+1(t) <
c+ (q + r − 1)d
q + r
, t = 0, . . . , p− 2, kt+1 ∈ Kt+1 ,
uk(p− 1) < (q + 2)a+ rb
q + r + 2
, k ∈ K .
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A set of inequalities sufficient for (1) to (5) to hold is therefore given by
sc+ d
s+ 1
>
a+ sb
s+ 1
,(6)
sc+ d
s+ 1
>
(q + 2)a+ rb
q + r + 2
,(7)
qa+ (r + 2)b
q + r + 2
>
(2p− 3)c+ 3d
2p
,(8)
qa+ (r + 2)b
q + r + 2
>
c+ (q + r − 1)d
q + r
,(9)
(2p− 1)c+ d
2p
>
(q + 2)a+ rb
q + r + 2
.(10)
3.1.4. Choosing parameters. We start by choosing r and q in order to satisfy the
inequalities (8) – (10). Since c > d we also have (2p−1)c+d2p >
(2p−3)c+3d
2p and
(2p−1)c+d
2p − (2p−3)c+3d2p = c−dp > 0. Choose m large enough such that 6(a−b)m+2 < c−dp
and c+(m−1)dm <
(2p−3)c+3d
2p . We can then find r ∈ {1, . . . ,m−1} and set q := m− r
such that
(2p− 1)c+ d
2p
>
(q + 2)a+ rb
m+ 2
>
qa+ (r + 2)b
m+ 2
>
(2p− 3)c+ 3d
2p
.
This directly implies (8) and (10). The inequality (9) follows from
(2p− 3)c+ 3d
2p
>
c+ (q + r − 1)d
q + r
.
Finally choose s large enough such that (6) is fulfilled and such that
sc+ d
s+ 1
>
(2p− 1)c+ d
2p
,
which implies (7) by (10). 
3.2. Proof Theorem 3.1 for HD and PD scenarios.
3.2.1. The graph and initial state. Let us define a graph G depending on p and four
parameters o, q, r, s ∈ N as depicted in Figure 3. We start with p complete graphs
K1, . . . ,Kp on o vertices. Again, the subgraphs Kn for n = 1, . . . , p are connected
in series to form a ladder-like structure. There is a subgraph Kp+1 which is a
complement of a complete graph on o vertices (isolated vertices) connected to the
ladder in the same manner. The vertices of Kn are denoted kn,m for n = 1, . . . , p+1
and m = 1, . . . , o, forming the sets Kn. Every vertex in the interior of the ladder
(the vertices in K2 to Kp) is connected to a vertex gR. Additionally, the vertex gR
has q + 1 other neighbors. It has q neighboring vertices of degree one forming the
set H and a neighbor which we call gD. The vertex gD has r neighboring vertices
of degree one forming the set I and s neighboring vertices of degree two forming
the set J . Each vertex in J is connected to a vertex gC .
Let X0 be the initial state defined by
(X0)v = 1 , v ∈ K1 ∪ J ∪ {gC} ,
(X0)v = 0 , v ∈
p+1⋃
n=1
Kn ∪H ∪ I ∪ {gD, gR} .
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3.2.2. Dynamics. Let X = (X(0), X(1), . . . ) be the trajectory of the evolutionary
game with parameters (a, b, c, d), synchronous update order, mean utility and imi-
tation dynamics on the graph G constructed above with initial state X0. We will
show that for suitable parameters o, q, r, s the dynamics with initial value X0 is the
following. Cooperation spreads along the ladder of vertices in Kn to Kp and at time
t = p− 1 the strategy of all vertices of K2 to Kp is reset to defection. Formally
Xv(t) = 1 , v ∈
t+1⋃
n=1
Kn ,(11)
Xv(t) = Xv(t− 1) , otherwise ,(12)
for t = 1, . . . , p − 1 and X(t + p) = X(t) for t ∈ N0. See again Figure 3 for an
illustration.
k1,3
k1,2
k1,4
k1,1
k2,3
k2,4
k3,3
k3,4
k4,3
k4,4
k5,3
k5,4
k6,3
k6,2
k6,4
k6,1
gR
H
gD
I
gC
J
Figure 3. Example of the graph G with parameters p = 5, o =
4, s = 6, r = 1, q = 2 with strategy vector X(4). Cooperators are
depicted by full circles. Note, that this graph exhibits periodic
behavior as described in Section 3.2 for (a, b, c, d) =
(1, 0.45, 1.24, 0).
The following conditions must be satisfied in order for X to fulfill (11) and (12).
• The vertices gR, gC , gD and all vertices in H, I, J keep their strategy. The
defector gD must prevent the vertex gR from changing its strategy, must not
change its own strategy and must not change the strategy of the cooperators
in J . This is guaranteed by satisfying the inequalities
(o+ 1)a+ b
o+ 2
<
sc+ (r + 1)d
s+ r + 1
< a ,(13)
where a is the utility of the vertex gC and the fraction on the left hand side
of (13) is an upper bound for the utilities of the cooperating neighbors of
gD and gR.
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• For the cooperation to spread at time t, t = 0, . . . , p − 2, the boundary
cooperators in Kt+1 must have greater utility than the boundary defectors
in Kt+2, that is,
min
{
(o− 1)a+ b
o
,
oa+ 2b
o+ 2
}
>
c+ (o+ 1)d
o+ 2
.(14)
Here the first term on the left is the utility of the cooperators in K1 at t = 0
and the second term is the utility of boundary cooperators in subsequent
time steps.
• The vertex gR must not be stronger than the cooperators in Km for t =
0, . . . , p − 2 and 1 ≤ m ≤ t + 1 for the cooperation to be able to spread,
hence
oa+ 2b
o+ 2
>
(p− 2)oc+ (o+ q + 1)d
(p− 1)o+ q + 1 .(15)
Simultaneously, the defecting vertex gR must be able to change the strategy
of all neighboring cooperators to defection at time p− 1, thus
a <
(p− 1)oc+ (q + 1)d
(p− 1)o+ q + 1 .(16)
3.2.3. Choosing parameters. We now show that there exists a choice of parameters
o, q, r, s ∈ N such that the inequalities (13) – (16) are satisfied.
Without loss of generality, we assume a = 1, d = 0 (see [6], Remark 8.). Since the
denominators in (15), (16) are positive, we can multiply both sides by the product
of the denominators and express q in the terms of o. The inequality (15) gives
q >
o2 ((1− p)(1− c)− c)− o (2(p− 1)b− 2(p− 2)c+ 1)− 2b
o+ 2b
(17)
and the inequality (16) gives
q < o(p− 1)(c− 1)− 1 .(18)
If we depict both inequalities in the first quadrant of the o-q plane, the inequality
(17) is satisfied above the line given by the function on the right hand side. The
function on the right hand side asymptotically approaches the line with slope
σ1 = (1− p)(1− c)− c .
The inequality (18) is satisfied below the line with positive slope
σ2 = (p− 1)(c− 1) > 0 .
The difference of the slopes σ2 − σ1 = c > 0 is always positive and we are therefore
able to find o, q ∈ N such that the inequalities (15) and (16) are satisfied, see Figure
4. Furthermore, we can choose o, q arbitrarily big. Since a > d holds, the number
o can be chosen great enough such that (14) is satisfied.
Since c > a > d holds, we can find integers r, s ∈ N (possibly very big ones) such
that (13) is satisfied (implicitly using the density of rational numbers and the fact
that our parameters are generic).
Thus, we are able to find parameters o, q, r, s ∈ N such that the equations (13) –
(16) are satisfied and subsequently, X is a periodic trajectory of E = (G, pi, u, T , ϕ)
with initial state X0 having minimal period length p. 
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o
q
oa+2b
o+2 >
(p−2)oc+(o+q+1)d
(p−1)o+q+1 (15)
a < (p−1)oc+(q+1)d(p−1)o+q+1 (16)
Figure 4. Regions of parameters o, q satisfying the inequali-
ties (15)and (16). The regions are depicted for (a, b, c, d) =
(1,−0.45, 1.35, 0) and p = 10.
4. Periodic orbits on an acyclic graph
Interestingly, periodic behavior of an evolutionary game on a graph can be ob-
served even in the case when the underlying graph is a tree. The absence of cy-
cles demands a new view on the periodic dynamics since the information (strategy
change) can spread only gradually through the graph; for example there is no way of
”resetting” vertex strategies. Nevertheless, for specific parameter regions arbitrary
long periodic behavior can occur.
Theorem 4.1. Let pi = (a, b, c, d) ∈ P be admissible parameters satisfying the
conditions of the HD scenario, c > a > b > d, u the mean utility function, T the
synchronous update order, ϕ deterministic imitation dynamics and p0 ∈ N. There
exists an acyclic graph G, a number p ∈ N0 such that p ≥ p0 and an initial state X0
such that X = (X(0), X(1), . . .) is a periodic trajectory of minimal length p of the
evolutionary game E = (G, pi, u, T , ϕ) on a graph with initial state X0.
4.1. Proof of Theorem 4.1. .
4.1.1. The graph and initial state. Let us define a graph G whose structure is de-
pendent on two parameters q, r. The graph G is a rooted r-nary tree such that
• the root h0 has only one child h1,
• every vertex in level 1 to q − 2 has exactly r children,
• exactly r2 vertices in level q−1 with pairwise different predecessors at level
3 are leaves,
• every other vertex in level q − 1 has r children which are leaves.
See Figure 5 for an illustration.
For the sake of simplicity, we focus only on one branch of the tree G rooted in
a fixed vertex h3 at level 3. The vertices in the other branches follow the same
dynamics by symmetry reasons (the initial state and the graph G are invariant with
respect to an automorphism exchanging the whole branches rooted at level 3). The
descendant of h1 at level q−1 in the fixed branch which is a leaf is denoted by hq−1.
The vertices in a path from h1 to hq−1 will be denoted by h1, h2, . . . , hq−1 in an
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h1 h2 h3
h4
h5
h0
I3
I4
Figure 5. Example of the graph constructed in the proof of The-
orem 4.1 with an initial condition. The cooperators are depicted
by filled black circles, defectors by white ones. The parameters are
r = 3, q = 6
increasing manner. The vertices in {h1, . . . , hq−1} = H are called special vertices.
The set of all descendants of hm for m = 3, . . . , q − 2 which are not in H will be
denoted by Im. Vertices in I :=
⋃q−2
m=3 Im are called ordinary vertices.
Let the initial condition X0 be such that every vertex in levels 0, . . . , q − 2 is
cooperating and every other vertex is defecting, that is,
(X0)v = 1 , v ∈ N≤q−2(h0) ,
(X0)v = 0 , otherwise .
See Figure 5 for illustration of the graph construction and initial condition.
4.1.2. The dynamics. The dynamics of the system in one period can be divided into
three qualitatively different phases. There are three important events that occur
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during one period. At time t = 0, all vertices at level at most q−2 cooperate and all
vertices at the levels q− 1 and q defect. From here, defection is spreading along the
special vertices to the root and outward towards the boundary along the ordinary
vertices. We call this phase the shrinking phase. At time step t = q − 3, the only
special vertices which cooperate are those at level 0 and 1. There are however a few
clusters of cooperating ordinary vertices left in the higher levels. Starting from the
root, the central cooperating cluster is growing again and at time t = (q−3)+(q−5)
there is only this central cluster of cooperators left which encompasses all vertices
at level at most q−4. Two time steps later, at t = 2(q−3), this cluster encompasses
all vertices at level at most q − 2 and we are back at the initial state. Please refer
to the example in Section 4.2 and Figures 10–15 for an illustration of the dynamics.
The local dynamics is essentially governed by the following two lemmas.
Lemma 4.2. Consider parameters (a, b, c, d) ∈ P such that
a+ rb
r + 1
>
c+ rd
r + 1
.(19)
Let i be a vertex which is a boundary cooperator at time t. If i is connected to one
cooperator and r boundary defectors, whose defecting neighbors have utility lower
that a+rbr+1 and whose only cooperating neighbor is i, then i and all of its defecting
neighbors will cooperate in the next time step.
BC
BD
ϕ
?
Figure 6. Illustration of the local situation in Lemma 4.2. Gen-
erally, nothing can be stated about the behavior of the cooperating
neighbor on the left.
Proof. The defecting neighbors of i have utility c+rdr+1 , and their defecting neighbors
have utility smaller than a+rbr+1 . Both of these quantities are lower then the utility
of i, which is a+rbr+1 . 
See Figure 6 for an illustration of Lemma 4.2.
Lemma 4.3. Consider parameters (a, b, c, d) ∈ P such that
a <
rc+ d
r + 1
.(20)
Let i be a vertex which is a boundary defector at time t. If i is connected to one
defector and r boundary cooperators, then i and all its neighbors will defect in the
next time step.
Proof. At time t, the vertex i has utility rc+dr+1 which is larger then a, the largest
utility that a cooperator can achieve. 
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BD
BC
ϕ
Figure 7. Illustration of the local situation in Lemma 4.3.
See Figure 7 for an illustration of Lemma 4.3.
Let X = (X(0), X(1), . . . ) be the trajectory of the evolutionary game on a graph
described above with initial state X0. We start with some simple observations.
Lemma 4.4. Let i be an ordinary vertex and let t ∈ N. All children of i have the
same state at time t.
Proof. This follows directly by a symmetry argument. For every pair of children
j1 and j2 of i there is an automorphism of the graph G that exchanges j1 and
j2. The initial state and the functions defining the dynamics are invariant under
such automorphisms of the graph, hence the same must hold for every state in the
trajectory. 
Lemma 4.5. Let i be an ordinary vertex. If Xi(t) = 0, then Xj(t+ 1) = 0 for all
children j of i.
Proof. Based on Lemma 4.4 we have to differentiate between only three cases. In
the first case all children of i are cooperators. By Lemma 4.3 they will switch to
defection. In the second case they are boundary defectors. Therefore all of their
children must be cooperators and again Lemma 4.3 shows that they will switch to
defection. In the last case the children are inner defectors which can not change
their strategy. 
The dynamics along the special vertices is very simple to describe. Let f :
{0, . . . , 2q − 6} → N be the function given by f(t) := |t − q + 3| + 1, see Figure 8.
A special vertex h` is cooperating at time t if and only if ` ≤ f(t). This is shown
together with a description of the dynamics of the strategies of the ordinary vertices
in the following theorem. Notice that property (f) and property (g) in Theorem 4.6
immediately imply that X has period 2q − 6 and property (a) implies that X has
no shorter period.
Theorem 4.6. The following invariants hold for the dynamics when 0 ≤ t ≤ 2q−6
(a)
Xh`(t) =
{
1 if ` ≤ f(t)
0 otherwise
, for all h` ∈ H`.
(b) h` is an inner cooperator if and only if ` < f(t).
(c) h` is an inner defector if and only if ` > f(t) + 1.
In the shrinking phase (0 ≤ t < q − 3) additionally the following properties hold.
(d) For m ≤ f(t) + 1 and i ∈ Im ∩N1(hm) we have Xi(t) = 1.
(e) For m > f(t) + 1 and i ∈ Im ∩N≤m−f(t)−1(hm) we have Xi(t) = 0.
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0 q − 3 2q − 6
1
q − 2
t
f
(t
)
=
|t−
q
+
3
|+
1
Figure 8. The function f governing the shrinking and expansion
of cooperation among the special vertices for q = 8.
In the expanding phase (q − 3 ≤ t ≤ 2q − 6), we have
(f) All vertices at level at most f(t) are cooperating.
(g) All vertices at level n with f(t) < n ≤ f(t) + 3 are defecting.
Proof. We show by induction that these invariants are true throughout the course
of the dynamics. Let s ∈ N and assume that the theorem holds for all t ≤ s.
Initial state; i.e. s = 0: Obviously, all of the points (a) - (e) hold true. Since all of
the vertices h` for ` ≤ q−3 are inner cooperators by (b), they preserve their strategy
at time 1. The defecting vertex hq−1 has utility c. Thus, the vertex hq−2 changes
its strategy to defection at time s + 1 while changing the strategy of vertices in
Iq−2∩N1(hq−2) to cooperation as a consequence of Lemma 4.2. Every other vertex
preserve its strategy at time s = 0 and thus, the points (a) - (e) hold true at time
1.
Shrinking phase; i.e. 0 < s < q − 3: The vertex hf(s)+1 is defecting and has one
defecting neighbor hf(s)+2 by (a). The children of hf(s)+1 are cooperating by (d).
Thus, using Lemma 4.3, the vertex hf(s)+1 and all of his neighbors are defecting
in the next time step. Together with (c), this proves the point (a) for time s + 1.
Using (d), this also immediately implies (b) (the boundary cooperators closest to
the root h0 of the cluster containing h0 are at level q − 2− s).
The vertices h` for ` ≥ f(s) + 1 are inner defectors by (c). Moreover, their
children are all defecting by (e). Thus, h` stay inner defectors for ` ≥ f(s) + 1. The
vertex hf(s) is a boundary defector by (b) and has r cooperating neighbors ((d) and
(a)). Lemma 4.3 implies the vertex hf(s) is an inner defector at time s+ 1 which is
(c) for the next time step.
The invariant (a) implies that the predecessors of all vertices in Im ∩N1(hm) are
cooperating for m ≤ f(s) + 1. The children of a specific vertex v in Im ∩ N1(hm)
are either all defecting (Lemma 4.4) and then Lemma 4.2 ensures the preservation
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of cooperation in s+ 1. If the children of v are cooperating then the vertex v is an
inner cooperator and preserves its strategy.
As a trivial consequence of Lemma 4.5, if all vertices in Im ∩ N≤m−f(s)−1(hm)
are defecting for m > f(s) + 1 then all vertices in Im ∩N≤m−f(s)(hm) are defecting
in the next time step. Furthermore, by (c) and (d) we can apply Lemma 4.2 to the
vertex hq+s−2. This gives (e).
Phase switch; i.e. s = q− 2: We already established (a) - (e) at time s+ 1. We still
have to show, that (f) and (g) hold at time s + 1. We have f(q − 3) = 1. There
are no ordinary vertices at level one, hence (d) holds at time s + 1 by (a). This
also shows (g) for special vertices. There is also no ordinary vertex at level two and
three, hence we only have to show (g) for ordinary vertices at level four. They are
contained in N≤m−2 ∩ Im for some m = 3, hence they are defecting at time s + 1
by (e).
Growing phase; i.e. q−3 ≤ s < 2q−6: Lemma 4.2 together with (f) and (g) implies
that all vertices at level at most f(s) + 1 will cooperate at time s + 1, hence (f)
holds. This also implies (b).
The special vertices hf(s)+2, . . . , hq−1 are inner defectors by (c) and hence also
defect at time s + 1. Therefore (a) is satisfied. If f(s) + 3 < q, property (g)
automatically holds at time s+1. Consider s with f(s)+3 < q. An ordinary vertex
at level f(s) + 4 is either an inner defector at time s and hence defects at time
s + 1 or it has only cooperating children and hence defects by Lemma 4.3. All in
all this shows that (g) is also fulfilled. Let v be a child of a special vertex h` with
` > s+ 1. By (c) it is defecting at time s. Either it is an inner defector and hence
also defects at time s + 1 or all its children are cooperators and it defects at time
s + 1 by Lemma 4.3. This established in particular that h` is an inner defector at
time s+ 1, in other words, (g). 
4.1.3. Parameter choice. The only assumptions we needed in the dynamics section
were the inequalities (19), (20) and the assumption that the parameters (a, b, c, d)
satisfy the conditions of the HD scenario (c > a > b > d). Let such a, b, c, d be
given. Clearly, r can be chosen great enough such that the inequalities (19) and
(20) hold.
The minimal period of the constructed trajectory is 2(q − 3). Setting q :=
max{5, dp0/2e+ 3} the period is at least p0. 
Remark 1. In the constructions in Sections 3.1 and 3.2, the behaviour of the
number of cooperators or more precisely the sequence (|{v ∈ V | Xv(t) = 1}|)t∈N0
was rather boring. During one period of the trajectory it was growing and reset to
the initial value at the end of the period. The behaviour of this sequence is much
more interesting for our tree construction as shown in Figure 9.
4.2. Example. Figures 10 – 15 depict an example of a trajectory on an evolutionary
game on a graph constructed in Section 4.1. Cooperators are depicted with black
circles, defectors are depicted with white ones. The players changing strategy in
the current time step are highlighted with a dashed circle. The parameters of this
graph are r = 3, q = 6. This trajectory can be observed for example for parameter
vector (a, b, c, d) = (1, 0.6, 2, 0) satisfying the inequalities (19), (20). Note that the
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Figure 9. Development of the number of cooperators for the evo-
lutionary game on the tree G in Section 4 with r = 3 and game
theoretic parameters (a, b, c, d) = (1, 0.7, 2, 0). On the left the tree
has depth q = 6, on the right q = 9.
inequality
b >
c+ rd
r + 1
(21)
holds for such a choice of parameters. Cooperation then spreads from outer coop-
erators towards the leaves between X(2) and X(3). In contrary, for b ∈ (0, 0.5)
the inequality (21) does not hold anymore. The outer cooperators (cooperators not
in the cluster containing the root h0) then vanish in X(3) and they do not spread
cooperation further. The strategy vectors X(t) and X(t+ 6) coincide for t ∈ N0.
This example and an example of an evolutionary game on a graph with q = 7
and all other parameters remaining the same can be found online in [15].
5. Conclusion
We showed that on arbitrary graphs the game theoretic parameters can not
exclude periodic behavior with long periods. Our proofs hold also true for a small
perturbation of the game-theoretical parameters a, b, c, d as a consequence of the
generic payoff assumption.
Our constructions rely heavily on the fact that we can choose the graph parame-
ters arbitrarily. This no longer works if we restrict to certain classes of graphs. For
example Theorem 4.1 partially answers Question 1 while restricting to the param-
eters (a, b, c, d) satisfying the conditions of the HD scenario, c > a > b > d, and the
class of acyclic graphs.
Natural classes of graphs we might restrict ourselves to are k-regular graphs (ev-
ery vertex has exactly k neighbors), vertex-transitive graphs (every pair of vertices
can be exchanged by a graph automorphism) or planar graphs (the graph can be
drawn in the plane without edge crossings). This leads for example to the following
question.
Question 2. For which game theoretic parameters (a, b, c, d) and positive integers
k, p is there a k-regular graph G such that the corresponding evolutionary game with
synchronous update and imitation dynamics on G has a periodic trajectory with
minimal period p?
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h1 h2 h3
h4
h5
h0
X(0) = X(6)
Figure 10. The example from Section 4.2.
h1 h2 h3
h4
h5
h0
X(1)
Figure 11. The example from Section 4.2.
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h1 h2 h3
h4
h5
h0
X(2)
Figure 12. The example from Section 4.2.
h1 h2 h3
h4
h5
h0
X(3)
Figure 13. The example from Section 4.2.
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h1 h2 h3
h4
h5
h0
X(4)
Figure 14. The example from Section 4.2.
h1 h2 h3
h4
h5
h0
X(5)
Figure 15. The example from Section 4.2.
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